remarks that they were right to ban "imitative" [µιµητική] poetry in light of the tripartite theory of the soul; such poetry corrupts the soul (595a-b). Socrates next proposes to define "mimesis as a whole" i [µίµησιν ὅλως], with a view to characterizing the imitative poet (595c 
INTRODUCTION
In Republic X Socrates accuses poetic "imitators" [µιµητικοί] of corrupting the soul (the psychological charge) and producing appearances that are far removed from truth (the metaphysical charge). The success of the psychological charge against mimetic poetry crucially depends on the success of the metaphysical charge; tragic poetry corrupts the soul by making images that are far removed from truth (that is, appearances of virtue and value). The dominant interpretive strategy cashes out the relationship between these two charges as follows: images corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior; all images are "far removed from truth" and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this strategy pits Book III against Book X; mimetic poetry forms the foundation of the guardians' early education (in Book III), but mimetic poetry is corruptive (in Book X).
In this paper I defend an alternative strategy. I contend that the metaphysical charge should be interpreted narrowly, to encompass false and illusory appearances of virtue and value produced via skiagraphic techniques. I argue that Socrates' critique of tragedy and Homeric poetry does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images per se, but rather on the plausible and interesting claim that tragedians and their leader, Homer, employ skiagraphic techniques -that is, the manipulation of temporal distances and the contrasting of fortune with misfortune and virtue with vice -in order to produce powerful illusions of virtue and value. Even the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously. I conclude with some thoughts about good mimesis and the importance of poetry to the larger project of the Republic.
One of the greatest interpretive difficulties facing Republic X commentators is specifying
what Socrates bans in Republic X. What is Socrates' target? At the outset of Book X Socrates generalities through producing appearances of particulars.
xiii While in Books II-III Socrates suggests that Greek poets radically misrepresent the ancient past (and hence have no, or at least flawed, cognitive access to the past), he does not linger on this point.
xiv According to Socrates, even if Greek poets are correct about the ancient past (for example, Cronos really did castrate his father), their poems must be banned, lest they produce a corruptive appearance of how one ought to live (377e-378c).
xv Given Socrates' focus on the psychological and behavioral effects of poetry, it is no surprise that Socrates sets aside the difficult epistemological question (addressed in the Ion) of whether and how the poet has cognitive access to the ancient past. Since the primary task of Book X is to demonstrate how tragedy and Homeric poetry corrupt the soul, Socrates focuses on tragedy's appearances of virtue and value, rather than tragedy's appearances of past particulars. The former -and not the latterare immediately relevant to demonstrating how tragedy corrupts the soul.
xvi However, well before Socrates accuses tragic poetry of corrupting the soul, Socrates denigrates the µιµητικός for producing appearances that are "far removed from truth" (598b4).
Thus, the metaphysical charge that such appearances are far removed from truth is distinct from the psychological charge that tragic poetry corrupts the soul. Nevertheless, the success of the psychological charge against tragic poetry depends on the success of the metaphysical charge.
This is because tragic poetry corrupts the soul "by making images that are far removed from truth" [εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα τοῦ … ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα] (605b). Tragic poetry corrupts the soul by producing appearances of virtue and value. xvii Thus, the success of the psychological charge depends on the success of the metaphysical charge.
How are tragedy's appearances "far removed" from truth? After all, given that the imitator, including the tragedian, produces appearances of likenesses of Forms, aren't mimetic appearances relevantly related to truth? If, in producing appearances, the imitator simply mirrors sensible reality (as the mirror analogy suggests), then the imitator's work is "trivial," but certainly not corruptive. xviii In addressing this problem, the dominant interpretive strategy has been to suggest that images corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior. In other words, the metaphysical charge is ordinarily interpreted very broadly, to encompass all images;
all images are "far removed from truth" and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to account for the fact that in Book X Socrates targets tragedy and Homeric poetry specifically, permitting painting and even some poetry. Even worse, this strategy pits Book III . And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).
How should we interpret this "further distinction?" Commentators emphasize that Socrates distinguishes µιµητική (from mimesis more generally) as the practice of "copying" appearances, as opposed to merely producing appearances. xx The practitioner of µιµητική, the µιµητικός, is unique in that she imitates appearances. xxi On this reading, Socrates targets mimesis that imitates appearances. The µιµητικός is "two removes from truth," in virtue of reproducing appearances of likenesses of Forms.
Of course, this cannot be the entire story. While I agree that the µιµητικός reproduces appearances, I deny that the µιµητικός is in the business of reproducing any and all appearances. xxii I will argue that Socrates' attention to skiagraphia suggests that the µιµητικός is a skiagraphic artist, who utilizes popular skiagraphic techniques to reproduce false or illusory appearances. One prima facie advantage of this interpretation is that it connects Book IX to Book
= "generally"?
= "a specific kind of generic appearance production" = "specifies the kind of" = "producing specifically" "leader" of the tragedians (595b-c). This is because tragedians draw on Homer to produce mimetic appearances, and Book X is concerned with the production and reception of mimetic appearances, rather than the mimetic impersonation of particular characters.
xxiv My analysis will proceed as follows: first, I will say a word about the content of banned poetry, characterizing the kinds of illusions such poetry produces. Next, I will turn to the techniques of the µιµητικοί, where my focus will be on the methods µιµητικοί employ to produce poetic illusions. Attention to the latter will reveal that Socrates does not attack poetic images per Similarly, the "bloom of youth" [ἄνθος] dresses up the inherent ugliness of a boy, such that he falsely appears beautiful (601b).
Skiagraphia: Painting
What is skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία] ? In the absence of extant examples of skiagraphia, art historians and archaeologists have wrangled over the exact nature of the practice. Drawing on a dearth of textual evidence, most scholars have postulated that skiagraphia essentially involved juxtaposing colors and shades to produce the optical illusion of three-dimensional reality.
xxix However, others have hypothesized that skiagraphia is a form of divisionism or a means of intensifying colors through the juxtaposition thereof. xxx In the absence of any extant Greek skiagraphia, it has been difficult to settle the debate.
However, the relatively recent discovery of Macedonian tomb paintings provides support for the view that skiagraphia essentially involved the modulation of shade and light so as to create the illusion of depth. Breaking conventional outlines and, in some cases, violating traditional tetrachromy, these wall paintings use tone mixtures and shadowing to produce the illusion of a three-dimensional reality, when viewed at a suitable distance (Plantzos, 172-9).
xxxi Plato associates the practice with juxtaposition (584a, 586a-c; Philebus 42b-c), distancing (523b;
Parmenides 165b-d; Theaetetus 208e; Philebus 42b-c), and deceptive illusion (365c, 583b, 586a-c; Laws 663b; Phaedo 69b; Theaetetus 208e; Philebus 42b-c).
xxxii The dialogues presuppose a shared knowledge of popular skiagraphia, frequently appealing to the practice in order to explain ethical illusion.
xxxiii Why suppose Book X targets skiagraphic painting, as opposed to painting entire? The best clues come at 602c-d, where Socrates claims that the µιµητικοί appeal to a part of the soul that forms beliefs on the basis of the following sorts of optical illusions:
Something looked at from close at hand doesn't seem to be the same size as it does when it is looked at from a distance. … And something looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of it, while something else looks both concave and convex because our eyes are deceived by its colors [χρώµατα] , and every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul. And it is because they exploit this weakness in our nature that skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία], conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little short of magical.
Remarkably, the µιµητικοί appeal to a part of the soul that forms beliefs on the basis of skiagraphic painting and optical illusions of size and shape, which manipulate colors and distances to deceive our eyes. Here, Socrates invokes the very techniques Plato and others associate with popular skiagraphic painters -that is, distancing and manipulation of color or light to produce illusions of size and shape. If Socrates had intended to target traditional, twodimensional painting, why would he claim that the mimetic painter appeals to a part of the soul that is susceptible to optical illusions produced via coloring and distancing techniques? Why would he actually employ the term "skiagraphia" (above)? Another indication that Socrates confines his critique to popular skiagraphia occurs earlier in the argument, at 598b-c:
… we say that a painter can pain a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, even though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and displays his painting at a distance, he can deceive children and foolish people into thinking that it is truly [ἀληθῶς εἶναι] a carpenter.
xxxiv Again, realistic, skiagraphic mural paintings fit Socrates' description, in that they would have produced the illusion of three-dimensional reality when viewed at a distance.
xxxv
What does skiagraphic painting have to do with poetry? Poetry does not produce the illusion of three-dimensional reality. Here it is important to take a cue from Republic IX, which offers a schema for how to interpret Socrates' skiagraphia analogies. Tragedy and Homeric poetry are analogous to skiagraphic painting not so much in the kind of illusion it produces (though there are some parallels xxxvi ), but more in how it produces its illusion; namely, through distancing and contrast techniques. In the next section, I examine how Socrates develops the skiagraphia analogy with respect to pleasure (in Book IX) and poetry (in Book X). I argue that
Socrates' critique of tragedy does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images, but rather on the plausible claim that tragedians manipulate temporal distances and contrast fortune with misfortune and virtue with vice in order to produce agathological and axiological illusions.
Even the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously.
2.3
Skiagraphia: Pleasure, Poetry and Poikilia I now turn to Socrates' skiagraphia analogies. First, I examine skiagraphic pleasure in Book IX.
Next, I turn to Book X, with a view to articulating the sense in which tragic poetry is skiagraphic. Book X's comparison of tragedy to skiagraphic painting and emphasis on deceptive contrasting and distancing techniques (familiar to us from Book IX's skiagraphic analysis of pleasure) strongly suggest that tragedy and its predecessor, Homeric poetry, are problematically skiagraphic.
In Book IX Socrates explicitly invokes skiagraphia at 586b7-c1, summarizing his analysis of 'mixed pleasures' (that is, pleasures arising from the cessation of pains xxxvii ) as follows:
Then isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere images and skiagraphia [ἐσκιαγραφηµέναις] of true pleasures? And doesn't the juxtaposition [ἀποχραινοµέναις xxxviii ] of these pleasures and pains make them appear intense, so that they give rise to mad erotic passions in the foolish … ?
Mixed pleasures are like skiagraphia's color mixtures; both produce illusions through juxtaposition or contrast. However, in Book IX Socrates is less interested in skiagraphia's illusions of three-dimensional reality and more interested in skiagraphia's illusions of color intensity.
xxxix Consider another color parallel at 584e6-585a5:
Is it any surprise, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions about lots of other things as well, or that they are so disposed to pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state that, when they descend to the painful, they believe truly and are really in pain, but that, when they ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? They are inexperienced in pleasure and so are deceived when they compare pain to painlessness, just as they would be if they compared black to grey without having experienced white.
In effect, Socrates tightens the analogy with skiagraphia, for the purposes of explicating hedonic illusion. Both skiagraphia and mixed pleasures achieve their illusions through juxtaposition. The neutral hedonic state (cessation of pain and pleasure) appears pleasurable to those in pain and painful to those in pleasure (583d-584a). It is important to note that the illusion in question is not an ontological illusion; there really is a color or a hedonic state. The illusion is an illusion of magnitude, produced in virtue of a contrast. The analysis of mixed pleasures in the Philebus illuminates this point:
Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures? … Because they [mixed pleasures] are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they. … They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real (41e10-42c3).
xl Both contrast and distance condition our perception of the felt magnitudes of pleasure and pain;
distancing and contrasting produce hedonic illusion. The experiencer's pleasures and pains are genuine hedonic states, but when contrasted and brought close, they appear and feel greater than they really are. Ultimately, such illusions are effective because their subject is positioned far from truth in the following sense:
Therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to the middle, as it seems, and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or being brought up to it, and so they aren't filled with that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. Instead, they always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. To outdo others in these things, they kick and butt them with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that they're trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes, and neither it nor the things they are trying to fill it with are among the things that are (585e5-586b4).
Because the subject is far from Forms (and the pure and stable pleasure of knowing Forms), she cannot dispel hedonic illusions. Just as skiagraphia's ontological illusions are effective so long as the viewer beholds the work in a place that is distant from the painting, so too mixed pleasures'
illusions are effective so long as the experiencer regards such pleasures in a place that is distant from Truth.
In the hedonic case, only the unique epistemic and hedonic situation of the subject determines the particular contrasts and distances that condition her experience of pleasure and pain. The painting and poetry cases are importantly different, in that the skiagraphic painter or poet determines the contrasts and distances that condition a spectator's experience of the work. According to Socrates, the popular poet imitates the "excitable and multicolored character" [τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος]. The ποικίλον character is easy to imitate and readily recognizable by "a crowd consisting of all sorts of people" (604e-605a). xliv The ποικίλος man is the democrat, whom Socrates describes in Book VIII:
And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he's idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, he's carried in that direction, if moneymakers, in that one. There's neither order nor necessity in his life, but he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as long as he lives. … I also suppose that he's a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicolored [ποικίλον], just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his life, since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living (561c5-e6).
Socrates likens the democratic city to poikilia; in particular, to a garish "coat embroidered with every kind of ornament" (557c4). Most people erroneously judge the coat to be most beautiful, because they are bewitched by its color contrasts (557c5-7). As we saw in Socrates' analysis of mixed pleasures, color and pleasure contrasts intensify the contrasted members. Similarly, variability in the democrat's actions and character create contrasts that amplify aspects of her action and character, such that she and her actions appear finer than they really are. What is more, ποικίλα characters and actions appear most fine to the majority. Thus, in imitating the democratic character and mode of life, the poetic imitator is "imitating sensibles as they appear"
(to the democratic majority), rather than as they are. These imitated appearances are skiagraphic illusions, insofar as they arise from contrasts.
Notably, tragic mimesis takes on the character of what is imitated; the mimesis is itself Achilles' previous glory and good fortune. Thus, it is no wonder that skiagraphic poets like
Homer imitate Achilles and other poikila characters; such characters and lives contain the very sorts of skiagraphic contrasts that amplify illusory appearances of virtue and misfortune and, by extension, the audience's problematic emotional engagement with tragedy, which nourishes the "pitying part" of the human soul (606b). In short, tragedy deals in skiagraphic contrasts. It buys its great illusions and great emotional power with the currency of poikilia. This, I take it, is a main pillar of Socrates' critique of tragedy. The other pillar of Socrates' critique is beyond the scope of this paper; namely, an analysis of how, exactly, tragedy's ethical illusions enlarge and corrupt the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. xlvi Nevertheless, unlike mere 'images of sensible particulars', ethical, skiagraphic illusions are a much better candidate for being the kind of thing that can plausibly corrupt the soul.
Finally, tragedians also manipulate temporal distances in order to magnify human good and bad. To see this, consider how "rational calculation" dispels the illusion of tragic misfortune:
First, it isn't clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn't make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren't worth taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible … . Deliberation. We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best. We mustn't hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they trip. Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure (604b8-d1).
Whereas the skiagraphic painter positions his painting far from the viewer, the skiagraphic poet positions human good and bad close to the audience. This closeness is a temporal closeness, in that it conveniently deletes the future, failing to capture a complete human life, within which the true sizes of goods and bads may be calculated. But there is another sort of closeness at issue
here -one that should recall Socrates' caustic remarks about the blind pursuer of mixed pleasures (585e5-586b4). Unable to occupy the timeless vantage point of intelligible Truth, which properly captures the cosmic insignificance of human beings, the hedonist embroils herself in "human affairs" -feeding, fattening, fornicating and killing others in her blind pursuit of false pleasures. Hence, by positioning his audience so temporally close to human calamities, the tragedian effectively distances his audience from the vantage point of intelligible Truth, not unlike how the intense experience of mixed pleasures distances one from true, pure pleasures.
xlvii
In sum, tragedians are analogous to the skiagraphic painter in that they employ contrast techniques and manipulate distances in order to create and sustain skiagraphic illusions.
Tragedy's illusions are agathological and axiological in nature; through contrasting good and bad and manipulating temporal distances, Greek tragic drama (which draws heavily on Homer)
constructs a false reality concerning value (for example, that the noble Achilles undergoes a terrible misfortune). In like manner, the skiagraphic painter contrasts colors and manipulates spatial distances in order to create and sustain illusions of color intensity and a false reality concerning ontology (for example, that the painting of a bed is truly a bed). This interpretation of
Socrates' analysis of tragedy receives support from Socrates' focus on skiagraphia and poikilia in the latter books of the Republic. In addition, it has the added benefit of making Plato's views on tragedy more intelligible. The idea that tragic drama relies for its power on contrasts is an interesting one, as is the suggestion that such contrasts create ethical illusions -illusions that have the potential to corrupt the human soul. Moreover, we are now in a position to appreciate why imitative poetry corrupts the soul by producing images. Such poetry utilizes skiagraphic techniques to produce ethical illusions; and, unlike images of sensible particulars, ethical illusions can plausibly corrupt the soul. 
THE DOMINANT INTERPRETATION
The dominant interpretive strategy locates poetry's allegedly corrupting nature in the intrinsic deceptiveness of images; by their very nature, images mislead or distort. Poetry corrupts audiences by producing images of virtue and value, which, due to their metaphysical status qua images, necessarily deceive viewers about virtue and value.
Time-crunched readers may skip section 3 and proceed to the conclusion on p. 23.
The Incompleteness Interpretation
I shall dub the first version of this interpretive strategy the "Incompleteness Interpretation" (II).
According to II, images are inherently deceptive insofar as they are "incomplete" and hence "deficient." xlix Consider again the following passage:
-Now, tell me this about the painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen? -The works of craftsmen. . And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).
On the basis of this passage, one might reasonably infer that mimetic images are "two removes from truth," because they are incomplete and hence deficient. Indeed, in the Cratylus Socrates insists that images are incomplete of their very nature; if an image of Cratylus presented every detail of Cratylus, it would be a Cratylus duplicate, not an image of Cratylus (432b-d). Thus, necessarily, mimetic appearances do not present truth in its entirety. A mimetic appearance only provides a single perspective (that is, an "incomplete view") of that which it imitates. The painting only presents one angle of the couch; similarly, the poem only presents one angle on virtue. Insofar as foolish audiences suppose that poems supply them with a complete picture of virtue, they are deceived. II not only specifies the sense in which mimetic images are "less true"
than that which they imitate; it also explains why imitative poetry corrupts the soul. To the extent that "foolish people" suppose that incomplete appearances of virtue and value represent the entire truth about virtue and value, they develop a superficial and ultimately damaging conception of how to live. Hence, II nicely ties the ontological inferiority of appearances (that is, their being "incomplete") to their capacity to mislead audiences about virtue and value.
However, II does not capture the structure of Socrates' argument. Socrates seeks to establish that Homer is a µιµητικός by demonstrating that he lacks both knowledge and correct opinion about that which he purports to imitate; namely, "what ways of life that make people better in public or private" (599d3-4). If II were correct, then the structure of Socrates' argument would likely be very different; having defined µιµητικοί as producers of something incomplete,
Socrates would have next pointed out that poetic µιµητικοί produce incomplete representations of virtue and value (epistemological arguments aside). Instead, Socrates argues that poetic µιµητικοί are completely ignorant about virtue and value, for which reason they employ skiagraphic techniques to produce illusory images of virtue and value. Moreover, such images are not incorrect in virtue of their incompleteness, but in virtue of their skiagraphic nature. And indeed, the Cratylus sharply distinguishes between the incompleteness of an image and its correctness or incorrectness; whereas all images are incomplete, only some lack correctness
[ὀρθότης] (432b-c).
The Multiplicity Interpretation
How can the painting of the couch misrepresent the couch, in the way that Homer's poetry misrepresents virtue and value? The "Multiplicity Interpretation" (MI) addresses this question.
According to MI, images necessarily misrepresent or distort sensible particulars in the same way that sensible particulars misrepresent or distort Forms. Just as the many perspectival appearances of the couch are "varied, changing and contradictory" with respect to the single sensible couch (of which they are appearances), the many sensible couches are "varied, changing and contradictory" with respect to the Form of the couch. Similarly, just as a sensible couch is "stable, uniform and consistent" with respect to the many perspectival appearances of it, the Form of the couch is "stable, uniform and consistent" with respect to the many sensible couches. The Divided Line seems to support this interpretation; sensible particulars are to Forms as sensible particulars are to images, with regard to truth (510a-b). In short, an image is removed from truth in the same way that a sensible particular is removed from truth; presumably, by being varied, changing and contradictory with regard to the relatively stable, uniform and consistent object to which it is related. Further support for this interpretation may be found in the fact that the poets portray the "multicolored" [ποικίλον] and "excitable" [ἀγανακτητικόν] character, whose various representations are changing and contradictory (604d-605a). Thus, poetic imitations of virtue are varied and changing with respect to their relatively uniform, stable and consistent object; namely, the good and rational character, who remains the same. As such, poetic imitations of virtue necessarily mislead (and hence corrupt) ignorant audiences, who are led to mistake multiple mimetic images of a good character for the real thing. Additionally, in
Book III Socrates criticizes the poets for being "multiply imitative" -that is, for imitating in voice and body many different things (395a), as opposed to singly imitating the good person (397d). Quite possibly, Socrates also faults the poets for producing competing and contradictory images of virtue and value. Temperance (respectively). lii However, as I have argued, an incorrect skiagraphic appearance of justice, courage, or temperance radically misrepresents and is fundamentally unlike that which it purports to be an image of (even if it bears certain similarities to the original). Censored poets are censored precisely because they construct their images such that they are not at all like [ὅµοια] their originals (that is, gods and heroes) (377d9). In other words, MI makes no room for the crucial distinction that sits at the heart of Socrates' argument; namely, the distinction between correct and incorrect images. Skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value corrupt the soul, because skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value are incorrect. In contrast, correct images of virtue and value actually improve the soul, as evidenced by their prominent role in the education of the young (and, for that matter, in Plato's dialogues more generally).
A secondary problem with MI is this: If the relationship between Forms and sensibles and sensibles and images were one of radical distortion (as MI suggests), we should expect the kallipolis to be constructed very differently. First, the guardians would be banned from consuming any images of virtue, in poetry or otherwise, lest they come to accept misrepresentations of virtue. Second, a philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms would not qualify him or her to rule in the sensible realm, since knowledge of F would not necessarily enable one to identify a sensible instance of F (the latter being a radical distortion or gross misrepresentation of the Form of F). However, the kallipolis is not structured in this way.
Consumption of correct images of good characters (in the form of poetry) is an integral part of the guardians' early education. Also, the philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms uniquely qualifies him or her to rule in the sensible realm. A final passage nicely illustrates the point that sensible particulars and images [εἰκόνες] are likenesses of truth liii :
… am I not right in saying that neither we, nor the guardians we are raising, will be educated in music and poetry until we know the different Forms of moderation, courage, frankness, high-mindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites too, which are moving around everywhere, and see them in the things in which they are, both themselves and their images [εἰκόνας] … (402c1-6).
In sum, in addition to failing to make room for Socrates' distinction between correct and incorrect images, MI also commits its adherents to an independently implausible interpretation of the Republic.
That said, II and MI do get something right, which explains their initial plausibility.
Images are incomplete and multiple, and these very features distance them from truth or the Forms. However, the same can be said of sensible particulars. Just as the incompleteness and multiplicity of images presents a danger (insofar as images are mistaken for truth), the incompleteness and multiplicity of sensible particulars presents a danger (insofar as sensibles are mistaken for truth). The Lover of Sights and Sounds exemplifies this danger, insofar as she mistakes a sensible instance of F for the Form of F (476e). For example, Polemarchus mistakes a single just action (that is, giving someone what is owed to him) for justice entire (331e-332a).
However, this just action is incomplete and multiple. Being incomplete (that is, representing only one aspect of justice), it provides no guidance in some cases; and being "multiple" or "variable,"
it is unjust in one application (for example, giving weapons back to a madman) and just in another (for example, returning money to a sane person). Immersed in the world of likenesses, the lovers of sights and sounds (Polemarchus included) love poetry. Poetic likenesses present an equal danger to the lover, insofar as she sets up a likeness as the criterion for truth. Like sensible particulars, poetic likenesses are incomplete and multiple, in virtue of the fact that images, qua images, do not reproduce all and only the features of the original. Hence, a likeness is a likeness in some respects and not in others, just as a sensible particular is a likeness of a Form in some respects and not in others.
However, the educational system of the kallipolis protects against the danger of conflating likenesses and originals, insofar as it is specifically designed to teach students to distinguish between images, sensibles and Forms. For example, a guardian's education in mathematics and dialectic is intended to prompt her to exit the "cave" of likenesses and to enter the world of Forms, where she will recognize sensibles and their images for what they really are;
namely, mere likenesses. Hence, in the kallipolis poetic likenesses (that is, correct images) do not pose a danger and so are not banned. Thus, while II and MI correctly capture some potentially deceptive features of likenesses, these features do nothing to explain Plato's banishment of the µιµητικοί.
CONCLUSION
This paper has centered on Republic X and a notion of µιµητική developed therein. But Republic VI introduces another kind of mimesis; namely, that of the philosopher rulers:
No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates [µιµεῖσθαί] them and tries to become as like them as he can [µάλιστα ἀφοµοιοῦσθαι]. … And if he should be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman [δηµιουργόν] of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue? -He least of all. And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model [οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγµατι χρώµενοι ζωγράφοι]? … And I suppose that, as they work, they'd look [ἀποβλέποιεν] often in each direction towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and towards those they're trying to put into human beings, on the other. And in this way they'd mix and blend the various ways of life in the city until they produced a human image based on what Homer too called "the divine form and image" when it occurred among human beings (500b7-501b6).
The philosopher king or queen is not unlike the demiurge of the Timaeus, who, in crafting the cosmos, imitates the "divine model" (that is, the Forms). I do not deny that mimesis of the Forms (with a view to producing sensible particulars) is a kind of "good mimesis," analogical to (albeit distinct from) the concept of 'mimesis' developed in Republic III and X. liv What I deny is that such mimesis is the only form of good mimesis. The poetic mimesis of sensible particulars "as they are" -with a view to producing correct images of goods and bads -also constitutes good mimesis. Such "philosophic" mimesis would be careful to avoid deceptive contrasts that amplify goods and bads and would position human goods and bads in their rightful cosmic context.
However, philosophers are not in the business of composing poetry, despite their special cognitive access to the Forms. Possessing genuine knowledge of virtue and value, they devote their time to fine deeds rather than poetic images thereof (599a-b). Nevertheless, they supervise the poets, communicating to them correct opinions about virtue and value. So, Socrates declares at 379a:
You and I, Adeimantus, aren't poets, but we are founding a city. And it's important for the founders to know the patterns on which the poets must base their stories and from which they mustn't deviate. But we aren't actually going to compose their poems for them (379a).
Thus, unsurprisingly, in Republic X Socrates anticipates the possibility of imitative painters consulting the makers of artifacts, so as to gain correct opinion regarding fine artifacts (601e-602a). Similarly, it seems, the kallipolis poets would consult the "craftsmen of the city's (who follow the prescriptions of others regarding virtue) and "poet-creators" (who discover true virtue themselves) produce reformed poetry. However, her analysis is a broad analysis of Plato's works, rather than a focused analysis of Republic X. liv Why isn't mimesis of Forms (which involves producing sensibles, not images) included in Republic X's discussion of mimesis, given that the stated aim of the discussion is to define 'mimesis in general?' Strangely, Book X's categorization of "makers" would classify both the philosopher king and the demiurge as "craftsmen" in contrast to "imitators." Both look to the Forms with a view to producing sensibles. (In a similar vein, the carpenter looks to the Form of the couch with a view to producing the sensible couch.) Possibly, in setting out to define "µίµησις ὅλως" Socrates means to define what is "wholly" and "completely" mimesis. Certainly, the demiurge and philosopher king are mimetic in some respects, but (unlike the poet) they are genuinely "craftsmanlike" in other respects (i.e., in virtue of producing sensible artifacts reflective of Forms). So, they are not completely mimetic and hence fall outside of the Republic X discussion. lv To be sure, a philosopher's pleasures are superior because they involve being filled with Forms. However, importantly, the tyrant's pleasures are not grossly inferior because they involve being filled with images, but rather because they are thoroughly skiagraphic and, as a result, hedonically false. This criticism of the tyrant's pleasures survives, whether or not we accept Forms. lvi One might object that my interpretation fails to reconcile the differing accounts of "µιµητική" or "imitativeness" in Republic X and III. In other words, how does the practice of copying appearances (as articulated in Republic X) connect with µιµητική as it is defined in Republic III; namely, seriously impersonating (in voice and body) many different characters, both good and bad? (As I have noted on p. 2, impersonation is nonequivalent to µιµητική, because impersonation of good characters is permitted and even encouraged, whereas poetic µιµητική is banned. See Belfiore, A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic for the view that µιµητική essentially involves being "multiply
